

Through this lawsuit, the Receiver seeks the return of these funds in order to make an equitable distribution to claimants.

4. IEM entered into two contracts with Stanford Financial Group Company (“SFGC”), the first dated November 4, 2005 and the second dated June 1, 2006. In both contracts, IEM agreed to “use its best efforts to develop and implement programs and strategies” as described in a proposal attached to the contracts. The proposal included a variety of tasks and objectives, including helping to “meet SGH’s growth and expansion goals,” “design[ing] methods for growing money under management,” and “realign[ing] compensation to support a performance based culture.”

5. The Receiver’s investigation thus far has uncovered very little information about what services, if any, IEM actually provided to SFGC or other Stanford Parties. Indeed, the Receiver has located no work records, invoices or meaningful work-product that could possibly support transfers of over \$4 million to IEM.

6. In an effort to learn more and perform his Court-ordered duties, the Receiver served a subpoena on IEM on March 23, 2010, seeking documents regarding the nature of IEM’s relationship with Stanford, and any services it may have provided to Stanford in exchange for the payments it received. IEM responded by filing a motion to quash, asserting that the subpoena was “abusive,” “overly broad,” and “unduly burdensome.” (*See* Doc. 1050.) Although the Receiver has been working with counsel for IEM, IEM has not agreed — and apparently will not agree — to produce its work records or work-product supporting the work it allegedly performed in exchange for over \$4 million.

7. IEM’s services provided no reasonably equivalent value to the creditors and victims of the Stanford Parties’ Ponzi scheme.

8. At all times relevant to this complaint, the Stanford Parties were insolvent, and Defendant Allen Stanford operated the Stanford entities in furtherance of his fraudulent scheme. Each payment from the Stanford Parties to IEM was made with actual intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the Stanford Parties' creditors.

9. The Receiver was only able to discover the fraudulent nature of the above-referenced transfers after Allen Stanford and his accomplices were removed from control of the Stanford entities, and after a time-consuming and extensive review of thousands upon thousands of paper and electronic documents relating to the Stanford entities.

10. The Receiver seeks an order that: (a) the payments from the Stanford Parties to IEM constitute fraudulent transfers under applicable law or, in the alternative, unjustly enriched IEM; (b) the payments from the Stanford Parties to IEM are property of the Receivership Estate held pursuant to a constructive trust for the benefit of the Receivership Estate; (c) IEM is liable to the Receivership Estate for an amount equaling the payments it received from the Stanford Parties; and (d) the Receiver is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and interest.

JURISDICTION & VENUE

11. This Court has jurisdiction over this action, and venue is proper, under Section 22(a) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)), Section 27 of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78aa), and under Chapter 49 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure (28 U.S.C. § 754).

12. Further, as the Court that appointed the Receiver, this Court has jurisdiction over any claim brought by the Receiver to execute his Receivership duties.

13. Further, within 10 days of his appointment, the Receiver filed the original Complaint and Order Appointing the Receiver in 29 United States district courts pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 754, giving this Court *in rem* and *in personam* jurisdiction in each district where the Complaint and Order have been filed, including the Western District of Tennessee.

14. This Court has personal jurisdiction over IEM pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 754 and 1692.

THE PARTIES

15. Plaintiff Ralph S. Janvey has been appointed by this Court as the Receiver for the assets, monies, securities, properties, real and personal, tangible and intangible, of whatever kind and description, wherever located, and the legally recognized privileges (with regard to the entities) of Stanford International Bank, Ltd., Stanford Group Company, Stanford Capital Management, LLC, Robert Allen Stanford, James M. Davis, Laura Pendergest-Holt, Stanford Financial Group, the Stanford Financial Group Bldg., Inc., and all entities the foregoing persons and entities own or control, including, but not limited to Stanford Financial Group Global Management, LLC (“SFGGM”) and Stanford Financial Group Company (“SFGC”) (the “Receivership Assets”). Plaintiff Janvey is asserting the claims contained herein in his capacity as Court-appointed Receiver.¹

16. Defendant Interim Executive Management, Inc. is a Florida corporation with its principal office in Germantown, Tennessee.

17. IEM will be served pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or by other means approved by the Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

18. On February 16, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission commenced a lawsuit in this Court against R. Allen Stanford, two associates, James M. Davis and Laura

¹ The Receiver’s claims in this Complaint are related to his claims on file in Case No. 03:09-CV-0724-N before this Court.

Pendergest-Holt, and three of Mr. Stanford's companies, Stanford International Bank, Ltd. ("SIB" or "the Bank"), Stanford Group Company, and Stanford Capital Management, LLC (collectively the "Stanford Defendants"). On the same date, the Court signed an Order appointing a Receiver, Ralph S. Janvey, over all property, assets, and records of the Stanford Defendants, and all entities they own or control.

I. Stanford Defendants Operated a Ponzi Scheme

19. As alleged by the SEC, the Stanford Defendants marketed fraudulent SIB CDs to investors exclusively through SGC financial advisors pursuant to a Regulation D private placement. SEC's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 952), ¶ 27.² The CDs were sold by Stanford International Bank, Ltd. *Id.*

20. The Stanford Defendants orchestrated and operated a wide-ranging Ponzi scheme. Stanford Defendant James M. Davis has admitted that the Stanford fraud was a Ponzi scheme from the beginning. Doc. 771 (Davis Plea Agreement) at ¶ 17(n) (Stanford, Davis, and other conspirators created a "massive Ponzi scheme"); Doc. 807 (Davis Tr. of Rearraignment) at 16:16-17, 21:6-8, 21:15-17 (admitting the Stanford Ponzi fraud was a "massive Ponzi scheme ab initio").

21. In marketing, selling, and issuing CDs to investors, the Stanford Defendants repeatedly touted the CDs' safety and security and SIB's consistent, double-digit returns on its investment portfolio. SEC's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 952), ¶¶ 32-33.

22. In its brochure, SIB told investors, under the heading "Depositor Security," that its investment philosophy is "anchored in time-proven conservative criteria, promoting stability in [the Bank's] certificate of deposit." SIB also emphasized that its "prudent approach and

² Unless otherwise stated, citations to Court records herein are from the case styled *SEC v. Stanford Int'l Bank, Ltd., et al.*, Civil Action No. 3-09-CV-0298-N.

methodology translate into deposit security for our customers.” *Id.* ¶ 34. Further, SIB stressed the importance of investing in “marketable” securities, saying that “maintaining the highest degree of liquidity” was a “protective factor for our depositors.” *Id.*

23. In its 2006 and 2007 Annual Reports, SIB told investors that the Bank’s assets were invested in a “well-balanced global portfolio of marketable financial instruments, namely U.S. and international securities and fiduciary placements.” *Id.* ¶ 35. More specifically, SIB represented that its 2007 portfolio allocation was 58.6% equity, 18.6% fixed income, 7.2% precious metals and 15.6% alternative investments. *Id.*

24. Consistent with its Annual Reports and brochures, SIB trained SGC financial advisors, in February 2008, that “liquidity/marketability of SIB’s invested assets” was the “most important factor to provide security to SIB clients.” *Id.* ¶ 36. In training materials, the Stanford Defendants also claimed that SIB had earned consistently high returns on its investment of deposits (ranging from 11.5% in 2005 to 16.5% in 1993). *Id.* ¶ 49.

25. Contrary to the Stanford Defendants’ representations regarding the liquidity of SIB’s portfolio, SIB did not invest in a “well-diversified portfolio of highly marketable securities.” Instead, significant portions of the Bank’s portfolio were misappropriated by the Stanford Defendants and were either placed in speculative investments (many of them illiquid, such as private equity deals), diverted to other Stanford Entities “on behalf of shareholder” – *i.e.*, for the benefit of Allen Stanford, or used to finance Allen Stanford’s lavish lifestyle (*e.g.*, jet planes, a yacht, other pleasure craft, luxury cars, homes, travel, company credit cards, etc.). In fact, at year-end 2008, the largest segments of the Bank’s portfolio were at least \$1.6 billion in undocumented “loans” to Defendant Allen Stanford; private equity; and over-valued real estate. *See id.* ¶¶ 39-40.

26. In an effort to conceal their fraud and ensure that investors continued to purchase the CD, the Stanford Defendants fabricated the performance of SIB's investment portfolio. *Id.* ¶ 4.

27. SIB's financial statements, including its investment income, were fictional. *Id.* ¶¶ 4, 53. In calculating SIB's investment income, Stanford Defendants Allen Stanford and James Davis provided to SIB's internal accountants a pre-determined return on investment for the Bank's portfolio. *Id.* Using this pre-determined number, SIB's accountants reverse-engineered the Bank's financial statements to reflect investment income that SIB did not actually earn. *Id.*

28. For a time, the Stanford Defendants were able to keep the fraud going by using funds from current sales of SIB CDs to make interest and redemption payments on pre-existing CDs. *See id.* ¶ 1. However, in late 2008 and early 2009, CD redemptions increased to the point that new CD sales were inadequate to cover redemptions and normal operating expenses. As the depletion of liquid assets accelerated, this fraudulent Ponzi scheme collapsed.

29. Most of the above facts discovered from Stanford's records have since been confirmed by Stanford's Chief Financial Officer, James Davis, who has pleaded guilty to his role in running the Stanford Ponzi scheme.

II. Stanford Transferred Funds from the Ponzi Scheme to IEM.

30. Funds from the Ponzi scheme described above were transferred by or at the direction of the Stanford Parties to IEM. IEM did not perform services of reasonably equivalent value in exchange for those payments, and performed services that were designed to further the operations of the Ponzi scheme and that may well have assisted Stanford in attracting new victim investors. Any services provided by IEM were of no utility — and, therefore, were of no value — from the perspective of the Stanford Parties' creditors.

31. The transfers to IEM consisted of at least \$1,103,282 in 2006; \$1,510,996 in 2007; \$1,226,792 in 2008; and \$201,358 in 2009.

REQUESTED RELIEF

32. This Court appointed Ralph S. Janvey as Receiver for the Receivership Assets. Order Appointing Receiver (Doc. 10) at ¶¶ 1-2; Amended Order Appointing Receiver (Doc. 157) at ¶¶ 1-2. The Receiver seeks the relief described herein in this capacity.

33. Paragraph 4 of the Order Appointing Receiver, signed by the Court on February 16, 2009, authorizes the Receiver “to immediately take and have complete and exclusive control, possession, and custody of the Receivership Estate and to any assets traceable to assets owned by the Receivership Estate.” Order Appointing Receiver (Doc. 10) at ¶ 4; Amended Order Appointing Receiver (Doc. 157) at ¶ 4. Paragraph 5(c) of the Order specifically authorizes the Receiver to “[i]nstitute such actions or proceedings [in this Court] to impose a constructive trust, obtain possession, and/or recover judgment with respect to persons or entities who received assets or records traceable to the Receivership Estate.” Order Appointing Receiver (Doc. 10) at ¶ 5(c); Amended Order Appointing Receiver (Doc. 157) at ¶ 5(c).

34. One of the Receiver’s key duties is to maximize distributions to defrauded investors and other claimants. *See* Amended Order Appointing Receiver (Doc. 157) at ¶ 5(g), (j) (ordering the Receiver to “[p]reserve the Receivership Estate and minimize expenses in furtherance of maximum and timely disbursement thereof to claimants”); *Scholes v. Lehmann*, 56 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1995) (receiver’s “only object is to maximize the value of the [estate assets] for the benefit of their investors and any creditors”); *SEC v. TLC Invs. & Trade Co.*, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 2001); *SEC v. Kings Real Estate Inv. Trust*, 222 F.R.D. 660, 669 (D. Kan. 2004). But before the Receiver can attempt to make victims whole, he must locate

and take exclusive control and possession of assets of the Estate or assets traceable to the Estate. Doc. 157 ¶ 5(b).

I. The Receiver is Entitled to Disgorgement of Assets Fraudulently Transferred to IEM.

35. The Receiver is entitled to disgorgement of the funds transferred from the Stanford Parties to IEM because such payments constitute fraudulent transfers under applicable law. The Stanford Parties made the payments to IEM with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Stanford's creditors; as a result, the Receiver is entitled to the disgorgement of those payments. Additionally, the Stanford Parties transferred the funds to IEM at a time when the Stanford Parties were insolvent, and the Stanford Parties did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfers.

36. The Receiver may avoid transfers made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. “[T]ransfers made from a Ponzi scheme are presumptively made with intent to defraud, because a Ponzi scheme is, as a matter of law, insolvent from inception.” *Quilling v. Schonsky*, No. 07-10093, 2007 WL 2710703, at *2 (5th Cir. Sept. 18, 2007); *see also Warfield v. Byron*, 436 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2006) (“ . . . [the debtor] was a Ponzi scheme, which is, as a matter of law, insolvent from its inception. . . . The Receiver’s proof that [the debtor] operated as a Ponzi scheme established the fraudulent intent behind transfers made by [the debtor].”).

37. The Stanford Parties were running a Ponzi scheme, which included SFGC and SFGGM, and paid IEM with funds taken from unwitting SIB CD investors. The Receiver is, therefore, entitled to disgorgement of the funds the Stanford Parties fraudulently transferred to IEM.

38. Consequently, the burden is on IEM to establish an affirmative defense, if any, of good faith and provision of reasonably equivalent value. *See, e.g., Scholes*, 56 F.3d at 756-57 (“If the plaintiff proves fraudulent intent, the burden is on the defendant to show that the fraud

was harmless because the debtor's assets were not depleted even slightly."). The Receiver is, therefore, entitled to recover the full amount of the payments that IEM received, unless IEM proves *both* objective good faith *and* reasonably equivalent value.

39. The good-faith element of this affirmative defense requires that IEM prove objective — not subjective — good faith. *Warfield*, 436 F.3d at 559-560 (good faith is determined under an "objectively knew or should have known" standard); *In re IFS Fin. Corp.*, Bankr. No. 02-39553, 2009 WL 2986928, at *15 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2009) (objective standard is applied to determine good faith); *Quilling v. Stark*, No. 3-05-CV-1976-BD, 2007 WL 415351, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2007) (good faith "must be analyzed under an objective, rather than a subjective, standard. The relevant inquiry is what the transferee objectively knew or should have known instead of examining the transferee's actual knowledge from a subjective standpoint.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

40. There is no evidence that IEM provided any services in exchange for the fraudulent transfers it received. Even if it had, the Fifth Circuit has held that providing services in furtherance of a Ponzi scheme does not confer reasonably equivalent value. *Warfield*, 436 F.3d at 555, 560. Furthermore, consideration which has no utility from the creditor's perspective does not satisfy the statutory definition of "value." *SEC v. Resources Dev. Intern., LLC*, 487 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2007); *In re Hinsley*, 201 F.3d 638, 644 (5th Cir. 2000). IEM cannot now claim that, in return for furthering the Ponzi scheme and helping it endure, it should be entitled to keep the over \$4 million in payments it received from the Stanford Parties. Because IEM cannot meet its burden to establish that it provided reasonably equivalent value for such payments, the Receiver is entitled to the disgorgement of those funds.

41. Moreover, under applicable fraudulent transfer law, the Receiver is entitled to attorney's fees and costs for his claims against IEM. *See, e.g.*, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.013 (Vernon 2009) (“[T]he court may award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.”). As a result, the Receiver requests reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for prosecuting his fraudulent-transfer claims against IEM.

42. IEM cannot meet its burden to establish that it provided reasonably equivalent value for the payments received from the Stanford Parties and that it received such payments in good faith. Accordingly, the Receiver is entitled to the disgorgement of those funds.

43. In order to carry out the duties delegated to him by this Court, the Receiver seeks complete and exclusive control, possession, and custody of the payments received by IEM.

44. The Receiver was only able to discover the fraudulent nature of the above-referenced transfers after Allen Stanford and his accomplices were removed from control of the Stanford entities, and after a time-consuming and extensive review of thousands upon thousands of paper and electronic documents relating to the Stanford entities. Thus, the discovery rule and equitable tolling principles apply to any applicable limitations period. *See, e.g., Wing v. Kendrick*, No. 08-CV-01002, 2009 WL 1362383, at *3 (D. Utah May 14, 2009); *Quilling v. Cristell*, No. 304CV252, 2006 WL 316981, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 29, 2006); *see also* TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 24.010(a)(1) (claims may be brought either within four years of the transfer *or* “within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant”).

45. The Stanford Parties, who orchestrated the Ponzi scheme, transferred the payments to IEM with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud their creditors. The Receiver is, therefore, entitled to disgorgement of all payments fraudulently transferred to IEM. Pursuant to

the equity powers of this Court, the Receiver seeks an order that (a) the payments from the Stanford Parties to IEM constitute fraudulent transfers under applicable law; (b) the funds transferred from the Stanford Parties to IEM are property of the Receivership Estate held pursuant to a constructive trust for the benefit of the Receivership Estate; (c) IEM is liable to the Receivership Estate for an amount equaling the amount of funds transferred from the Stanford Parties to IEM; and (d) the Receiver is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and interest.

II. The Receiver is Entitled to Disgorgement of Assets from IEM under the Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment.

46. In the alternative, the Receiver is entitled to disgorgement of the funds paid to IEM pursuant to the doctrine of unjust enrichment under applicable law. IEM holds funds that in equity and good conscience belong to the Receivership for ultimate distribution to the defrauded investors. IEM has been unjustly enriched by such funds, and it would be unconscionable for it to retain the funds.

47. In order to carry out the duties delegated to him by this Court, the Receiver seeks complete and exclusive control, possession, and custody of the payments received by IEM.

48. IEM has been unjustly enriched by its receipt of the payments from the Stanford Parties. Pursuant to the equity powers of this Court, the Receiver therefore seeks an order that (a) IEM was unjustly enriched by the funds it received from the Stanford Parties; (b) the funds transferred from the Stanford Parties to IEM are property of the Receivership Estate held pursuant to a constructive trust for the benefit of the Receivership Estate; (c) IEM is liable to the Receivership Estate for an amount equaling the amount of funds transferred from the Stanford Parties to IEM; and (d) the Receiver is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and interest.

PRAYER

49. The Receiver respectfully requests an Order providing that:
- (a) the payments from the Stanford Parties to IEM constitute fraudulent transfers under applicable law or, in the alternative, unjustly enriched IEM;
 - (b) the funds transferred from the Stanford Parties to IEM are property of the Receivership Estate held pursuant to a constructive trust for the benefit of the Receivership Estate;
 - (c) IEM is liable to the Receivership Estate for an amount equaling the amount of funds transferred from the Stanford Parties to IEM; and
 - (d) the Receiver is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and interest.

Dated: April 23, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

By: /s/ Kevin M. Sadler

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ATTORNEYS FOR RECEIVER RALPH S. JANVEY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On April 23, 2010, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with the clerk of the court of the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the electronic case filing system of the Court. I hereby certify that I will serve IEM individually or through their counsel of record, electronically, or by other means authorized by the Court or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

/s/ Kevin M. Sadler
Kevin M. Sadler

JS 44 (TXND Rev. 2/10)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

<p>I. (a) PLAINTIFFS Ralph S. Janvey, Receiver</p> <p>(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff <u>Dallas County, Texas</u> (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)</p> <p>(c) Attorney's (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Kevin M. Sadler, Baker Botts, L.L.P., 98 San Jacinto Blvd., Ste. 1500 Austin, Texas 78701 Phone: 512-322-2500</p>	<p>DEFENDANTS Interim Executive Management, Inc.</p> <p>County of Residence of First Listed Defendant <u>Shelby County, Tennessee</u> (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)</p> <p>NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE LAND INVOLVED.</p> <p>Attorneys (If Known) John P. Lewis, Jr., 6420 Glenrose Ct. Dallas, Texas 75214 Phone: 214-742-5925</p>
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<p>II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> 2 U.S. Government Defendant</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)</p>	<p>III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)</p> <p>(For Diversity Cases Only)</p> <table style="width:100%;"> <tr> <td style="width:30%;">Citizen of This State</td> <td style="width:10%;"><input type="checkbox"/> 1</td> <td style="width:10%;"><input type="checkbox"/> 1</td> <td style="width:30%;">Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State</td> <td style="width:10%;"><input type="checkbox"/> 4</td> <td style="width:10%;"><input type="checkbox"/> 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Citizen of Another State</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 2</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 2</td> <td>Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 5</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 3</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 3</td> <td>Foreign Nation</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 6</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 6</td> </tr> </table>	Citizen of This State	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	Citizen of Another State	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	Foreign Nation	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
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IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

CONTRACT	TORTS	FORFEITURE/PENALTY	BANKRUPTCY	OTHER STATUTES	
<input type="checkbox"/> 110 Insurance <input type="checkbox"/> 120 Marine <input type="checkbox"/> 130 Miller Act <input type="checkbox"/> 140 Negotiable Instrument <input type="checkbox"/> 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment <input type="checkbox"/> 151 Medicare Act <input type="checkbox"/> 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excl. Veterans) <input type="checkbox"/> 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits <input type="checkbox"/> 160 Stockholders' Suits <input type="checkbox"/> 190 Other Contract <input type="checkbox"/> 195 Contract Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 196 Franchise	<p>PERSONAL INJURY</p> <input type="checkbox"/> 310 Airplane <input type="checkbox"/> 315 Airplane Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 320 Assault, Libel & Slander <input type="checkbox"/> 330 Federal Employers' Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 340 Marine <input type="checkbox"/> 345 Marine Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 350 Motor Vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 360 Other Personal Injury	<p>PERSONAL INJURY</p> <input type="checkbox"/> 362 Personal Injury - Med. Malpractice <input type="checkbox"/> 365 Personal Injury - Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability <p>PERSONAL PROPERTY</p> <input type="checkbox"/> 370 Other Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> 371 Truth in Lending <input type="checkbox"/> 380 Other Personal Property Damage <input type="checkbox"/> 385 Property Damage Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 610 Agriculture <input type="checkbox"/> 620 Other Food & Drug <input type="checkbox"/> 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 <input type="checkbox"/> 630 Liquor Laws <input type="checkbox"/> 640 R.R. & Truck <input type="checkbox"/> 650 Airline Regs. <input type="checkbox"/> 660 Occupational Safety/Health <input type="checkbox"/> 690 Other <p>LABOR</p> <input type="checkbox"/> 710 Fair Labor Standards Act <input type="checkbox"/> 720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations <input type="checkbox"/> 730 Labor/Mgmt. Reporting & Disclosure Act <input type="checkbox"/> 740 Railway Labor Act <input type="checkbox"/> 790 Other Labor Litigation <input type="checkbox"/> 791 Empl. Ret. Inc. Security Act <p>IMMIGRATION</p> <input type="checkbox"/> 462 Naturalization Application <input type="checkbox"/> 463 Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee <input type="checkbox"/> 465 Other Immigration Actions	<input type="checkbox"/> 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 <input type="checkbox"/> 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 <p>PROPERTY RIGHTS</p> <input type="checkbox"/> 820 Copyrights <input type="checkbox"/> 830 Patent <input type="checkbox"/> 840 Trademark <p>SOCIAL SECURITY</p> <input type="checkbox"/> 861 HIA (1395ff) <input type="checkbox"/> 862 Black Lung (923) <input type="checkbox"/> 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) <input type="checkbox"/> 864 SSID Title XVI <input type="checkbox"/> 865 RSI (405(g)) <p>FEDERAL TAX SUITS</p> <input type="checkbox"/> 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) <input type="checkbox"/> 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609	<input type="checkbox"/> 400 State Reapportionment <input type="checkbox"/> 410 Antitrust <input type="checkbox"/> 430 Banks and Banking <input type="checkbox"/> 450 Commerce <input type="checkbox"/> 460 Deportation <input type="checkbox"/> 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations <input type="checkbox"/> 480 Consumer Credit <input type="checkbox"/> 490 Cable/Sat TV <input type="checkbox"/> 810 Selective Service <input type="checkbox"/> 850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange <input type="checkbox"/> 875 Customer Challenge 12 USC 3410 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 890 Other Statutory Actions <input type="checkbox"/> 891 Agricultural Acts <input type="checkbox"/> 892 Economic Stabilization Act <input type="checkbox"/> 893 Environmental Matters <input type="checkbox"/> 894 Energy Allocation Act <input type="checkbox"/> 895 Freedom of Information Act <input type="checkbox"/> 900 Appeal of Fee Determination Under Equal Access to Justice <input type="checkbox"/> 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes
REAL PROPERTY	CIVIL RIGHTS	PRISONER PETITIONS			
<input type="checkbox"/> 210 Land Condemnation <input type="checkbox"/> 220 Foreclosure <input type="checkbox"/> 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment <input type="checkbox"/> 240 Torts to Land <input type="checkbox"/> 245 Tort Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 290 All Other Real Property	<input type="checkbox"/> 441 Voting <input type="checkbox"/> 442 Employment <input type="checkbox"/> 443 Housing/Accommodations <input type="checkbox"/> 444 Welfare <input type="checkbox"/> 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - Employment <input type="checkbox"/> 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - Other <input type="checkbox"/> 440 Other Civil Rights	<input type="checkbox"/> 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence <p>Habeas Corpus:</p> <input type="checkbox"/> 530 General <input type="checkbox"/> 535 Death Penalty <input type="checkbox"/> 540 Mandamus & Other <input type="checkbox"/> 550 Civil Rights <input type="checkbox"/> 555 Prison Condition			

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

1 Original Proceeding 2 Removed from State Court 3 Remanded from Appellate Court 4 Reinstated or Reopened 5 Transferred from another district (specify) 6 Multidistrict Litigation 7 Appeal to District Judge from Magistrate Judgment

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
28 USC 754 & 1692; 15 USC 78aa; 15 USC 77v(a)

Brief description of cause:
Receivership Claims for Disgorgement and Fraudulent Transfer

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER F.R.C.P. 23 DEMAND \$ 4,042,428 CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: JURY DEMAND: Yes No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) (See instructions)

PENDING OR CLOSED: JUDGE Godbey DOCKET NUMBER 3:09cv724-N

DATE 04/23/2010 SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD /s/ Kevin M. Sadler

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # _____ AMOUNT _____ APPLYING IFP _____ JUDGE _____ MAG. JUDGE _____